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Abstract  
 
Welfare reform has been at the top of the international policy agenda for nearly a decade. 
Many OECD countries have responded to high levels of long term unemployment and 
increased economic inactivity rates through major reforms aimed at creating work-based 
welfare systems. The new approaches have involved radical changes in traditional 
employment and welfare agency bureaucracies, usually coupled with decentralisation and 
the increased use of private and voluntary sector organisations for the delivery of active 
labour market programmes. This paper explores and contrasts the Australian ‘mutual 
obligation’ welfare state with the British ‘employment first’ approach to welfare reform, 
and assesses the ways in which the respective Governments are redefining the role played 
by the public and private sectors in delivering services and employment assistance for 
those without work. 
 
Introduction 
 
Welfare reform has been at the top of the international policy agenda for nearly a decade. 
Through the OECD ‘Jobs Strategy’ (1994) and, more recently, the ‘Employment 
Strategy’ of the European Union, member-states have compared and contrasted the ways 
in which they have responded to radical economic and social changes which have 
transformed labour markets, increased unemployment and economic insecurity, and 
generated social exclusion and welfare dependency. Each member-state may follow its 
own path to reform but the common aims of the emergent ‘welfare to work’ regimes have 
been to reduce unemployment and ‘welfare dependency’ by ‘activating’ benefit systems, 
improving employability, and reinforcing work incentives. 
 
Welfare to Work strategies are not just about abstract opportunities and incentives. 
Governments have coupled policy with organisational reform and have linked the 
transition to active benefit regimes with radical changes in the bureaucracies and 
institutions charged with delivering and administering programmes. The reasons for the 
perceived inadequacies of traditional systems are contested, but at least part of the 
problem has been attributed to the ‘top down’ inflexible nature of policy formation and 
implementation; to the fragmented structure and role of welfare bureaucracies and 
national employment services; and to the absence of competition and market forces. 
Monolithic national service agencies are being decentralised and public sector 
monopolies, especially in the public employment service, are being challenged. 
 
The most significant challenge comes from rapid change in occupations and labour 
markets. Across the developed economies the introduction and application of new 
technologies and working practices is transforming the distribution, duration and content 
of jobs and the ways in which people gain access to them. Throughout the OECD 
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traditional recruitment and hiring practices are being recomposed as employers look to 
harness the productivity and cost benefits generated by more flexible working patterns. 
Employment placement markets have been deregulated and in many countries 
Government’s have used market mechanisms and ‘contestability’ to increase the 
efficiency of their Public Employment Service (PES) (OECD, 2001a).The private 
recruitment industry, temporary work agencies and a diverse range of other organisations 
have expanded both to meet some of these new demands and to increasingly deliver the 
active labour market programmes that Governments have introduced to combat 
unemployment. Many of these organisations are specialised, or operate on a local basis, 
but others have grown into large multinationals (Thuy et al, 2001) 
 
This paper explores the new ‘mixed economy’ of providers that is emerging in welfare 
states, and reflects on the mixed benefits which it is delivering for clients. It compares 
and contrasts how the Australian and British Governments have tackled long term 
unemployment, and the role that both have given to the private sector in delivering 
employment assistance to those without work. Australia is significant because it is the 
only OECD country that has fully privatised its employment placement market - a 
“unique step” which, according to one report, “is being watched closely by employment 
Ministers around the world” (ESC, 1999: ix). The British Government has also embarked 
on a radical programme of welfare reform but, unlike Australia, the aim has been to 
harness the expertise and insights of the private sector through more limited ‘public 
private partnerships’.  
 
The difference between both countries is also evident in the way in which they have 
changed their employment assistance systems. In Britain the Labour Government has 
introduced a range of New Deal programmes which are at the forefront of its strategy for 
creating an ‘employment first’ Welfare State. The New Deals for the unemployed 
provide structured employment assistance which all individuals are required to 
participate in after certain durations of unemployment. This approach reflects the 
priorities established through the European Employment Strategy and was in part 
modelled on the Working Nation ‘Job Compact’ of the last Australian Labor 
Government. By contrast, the Coalition Government dismantled the Australian ‘Job 
Compact’ in 1996 and replaced it with varying levels of selective employment assistance 
allocated according to a complex classification system. This approach was then 
supplemented by the introduction of programmes linked to a ‘mutual obligation’ which 
requires many long term unemployed Australians to participate in a range of socially 
useful activities including, for those aged up to 40, ‘Work for the Dole’ (WftD). 
 
Australian Employment Assistance: Centrelink and the Job Network 
 
The 1996 Coalition Government was elected on a radical platform aimed at transforming 
the Australian labour market. A key element of the strategy involved redefining the rights 
and responsibilities of the unemployed. The job search obligations of the unemployed 
were increased and a Common Youth Allowance was introduced. The previous Labor 
Government’s ‘Job Compact’ was scrapped and the budget for active labour market 
programmes was halved (OECD, 2001b, p. 13). A fully contestable employment 
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placement market was created and the Commonwealth Employment Service was 
privatised into a company known as Employment National. 
 
In the new system benefit assessment, payment and job search monitoring were retained 
in a public sector agency, Centrelink, which acts as the Gateway to a fully privatised 
‘Jobs Network’. Centrelink staff administer work tests and assess levels of employability 
but apart from providing limited access to some computer screens it plays no role in 
finding or filling vacancies. Centrelink offices have few job search facilities available, its 
staff have little experience of the employment market and nearly all the agency’s 
performance indicators are focused on benefit processing and payment. Nevertheless, 
Centrelink is the main referral point where unemployed people are assessed and notified 
that they have to participate in certain programmes. The limitations of this computerised 
referral process were a constant source of friction, with ‘no show’ rates for particular 
programmes ranging from 30% to 60% (OECD, 2001b, p. 70). This not only had an 
impact on the management and viability of individual providers, but was a major factor 
behind the sharp increase in administrative benefit sanctions imposed on those who failed 
to attend (Pearce et al, 2002). 
 
Unemployed Australians now rely heavily on the privatised Job Network for access both 
to employment assistance and for information about vacancies. In its first phase the 
Network was made up of over 300 government, community and private organisations 
which were contracted to deliver three levels of service from about 1,200 sites. A second 
full competitive tendering round took place in 1999. This process had a major impact on 
Job Network contractors, consumed much administrative and organisational effort, and 
resulted in a noticeable dip in performance. It also resulted in significant changes. In 
particular, Employment national, the residual public sector provider, lost its most 
valuable contracts and there was a marked increase in the share of the market delivered 
by church based and voluntary sector organisations. The ‘second phase’ Jobs Network 
was made up of around 200 organisations delivering services from just over 2000 sites, 
although the more expensive case management based Intensive Assistance (which could 
last for up to a year or longer) was only delivered at about half of the sites.  
 
The three services provided by Job Network members included Job Matching, Job 
Search Training (JST) and Intensive Assistance (IA). Job matching involves finding and 
filling vacancies. Network members appear collectively to have attracted more vacancies 
from employers but for the unemployed job seeker the market created some confusion. In 
particular unemployed people have only been able to access information about particular 
vacancies by directly approaching the individual Network member with whom the 
vacancy is registered.  This could involve several visits, with no guarantee that the 
vacancy was still available. 
 
Job Search Training involves a structured course, lasting for several weeks, intended to 
remotivate the unemployed person, update their job search strategy and place them into 
work.  
 
 4
Intensive Assistance has been the most expensive element of the system and because a 
significant sum was paid on entry to the programme it is the contract from which 
Network members generate financial surpluses (PC, 2002). Network members developed 
a wide range of practices which aimed to identify and tackle individual employment 
barriers. Surveys with participants and employers recorded high satisfaction levels and 
the OECD concluded that the best providers were those “providing some specialist 
assessment, light training, counselling in job-search, self-confidence and life directions, 
etc., in-house” (2001b, p.125). The OECD also found, however, that many long term 
unemployed people had little contact with their providers and that “few providers 
appeared to be offering  effective services to address the underlying barriers to 
employment” (ibid, p. 193). One Government survey of participants found that less than 
half of them “had been sent to a job interview or to speak with an employer about a job” 
(ibid, p. 193), and nearly a quarter of those surveyed had “visited their provider only once 
or twice” (ibid, p. 59). This lack of contact has been important because participants are 
not expected to report regularly to Centrelink whilst in IA. 
 
Access to the different levels of employment assistance has been determined by the 
application of a  ‘Jobseeker Classification Instrument’ through which individual 
employability is assessed and rated. The ‘classification’ process is computerised and 
normally applied by front line Centrelink officers. Apart from completing answers to 
standardised questions there is little interaction between the client and officer (which has 
been one of the reasons many employment barriers have not been revealed until after the 
classification and referral process is completed). In theory the client has been able to 
choose which Job Network member they wish to register with, so long as places were 
available and they had a preference. In practice less than one in five have actually 
exercised a choice, and most of those have done so on the basis of location rather than 
performance. The majority of participants have been allocated a provider through an  
auto-referral system. Once allocated “job seekers are not permitted to move between Job 
Network providers” and they have had “little power to influence the choice of the 
services they may receive” (PC, 2002, p. 8.1). 
 
Initially an unemployed person entering IA agrees to a revised Preparing for Work 
Agreement. If still unemployed after 13 weeks the provider has been required to draw up 
a more detailed ‘Support Plan’ which should include the additional support the provider 
will be offering. The evidence from a Government evaluation confirmed, however, that 
most employment assistance was given in the first few months of participation, the time 
at which most job entries were secured. As time goes on individual client contact with 
employment officers diminished and “the intensity of job search activity and motivation 
of job seekers declines” (DEWRSB, 2001, p. 62). One independent study, which carried 
out survey research with front line advisers, reported that under Job Network caseloads 
had risen, staff were concentrating on the most job ready, and less effort was being given 
to tackling the employment barriers of the most difficult to place. It concluded that the 
incentive structure of the new market was driving “advisers towards quick, superficial 
interactions with job seekers and towards strategies which maximised the agency’s short-
term financial performance” (Considine, 2001, p. 140).  
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Front line research carried out by the author in 2001, which involved site visits with a 
broad range of providers, found also that few Network members had any procedures in 
place to ensure a smooth, let alone an employment focused, ‘handover’ to Centrelink 
officials for those people who were still unemployed after they completed Intensive 
Assistance. 
 
IA was not intended to be a ‘guarantee’ programme, automatically available to 
individuals after a certain duration of unemployment. Instead it was a selective 
intervention targeted at those considered to have the capacity to benefit. This meant that a 
significant group of long term unemployed people were not eligible for support and there 
was constant friction between Centrelink and Network members about who would be 
capable of benefiting from the support on offer. This had a particular impact on the 
Community Support Programme, a small scale programme belatedly introduced by the 
Government for some of those deemed not capable of benefiting from IA. 
 
The impact of the Job Network 
 
In the year ending March 2002 over 750,000 vacancies were notified on the ‘Australian 
JobSearch’ database; 320,000 job seekers were placed in work by Job Network members; 
just over 80,000 job seekers participated in JST; and 285,000 people participated in IA 
(DEWR, 2002, p. 4). The numbers getting jobs from IA had increased from less than 
2,000 a month when the Job Network started, to around 7,500 a month by the start of 
2002. The Department reported that three months after leaving  73% of those who were 
‘job matched’ were either employed (70%) or undertaking education and training; and of 
those leaving JST or IA the outcome rates were 47% (38% employed) and 42% (35% 
employed) respectively (DEWRSB, 2001, p.2). About half the jobs taken were part time. 
There was little information on what happens to that majority of participants who failed 
to get a ‘positive outcome’. 
 
Using a matched comparison net impact technique to allow for displacement and 
deadweight the Department’s own evaluation report concluded that overall IA was 
securing an additional net impact of about 10% and JST was securing about 3%.  The 
evaluation report suggested that these results were at least as good as those produced 
under the earlier Jobs Compact and that they have were secured “at a substantially lower 
cost” (ibid). Government Ministers have suggested that the results are far better and that 
the Job Network has been “one of the key achievements of the Howard Government” 
which involved replacing “an old-fashioned process driven system” with “an expanded 
network of services focused on finding people jobs” which has “consistently 
outperformed the former CES and at considerable lower cost” (Brough, 2002). 
 
These claims have been disputed. With others ACOSS, the peak body for the voluntary 
sector, suggested that the Government had not compared like with like. They concluded 
that although “competitive tendering was effective in driving costs down .. it weakened 
service quality”. The result was a reduction in support for the most long term 
unemployed “leading to poorer employment outcomes than the most effective (though 
not all) Job Compact programmes” (Davidson, 2001, p. 1).  An independent inquiry by 
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the Productivity Commission concluded also that the Department’s “evaluation methods 
overstate the benefits of the programme”. In their view “Job Network programmes have 
had small or uncertain effects on the job prospects of participants” and their net impact 
on employment has been “very modest” (PC, 2002, p. 5.1). 
 
One of the significant criticisms of the Network was its failure to reduce the proportion of 
long term unemployed ‘beneficiaries’. This is the unemployed population that remain on 
benefit payments for long durations as against the broader long term unemployed 
population measured differently through ABS surveys. One analysis of beneficiaries 
shows that between 1995 and 1998 unemployment remained flat and long term 
unemployment ‘tracked’ upwards (Davidson, 2001, p. 7). This was followed by strong 
employment growth until the end of 2000 with significant reductions in beneficiary 
unemployment. However, the long-term share of unemployment beneficiaries within the 
total rose with the OECD reporting that over 60% had been receiving benefit for over a 
year and over 40% had been on benefit for over two years (2001b, p. 93). Although there 
were a number of factors causing this, the OECD suggested that the complex interplay of 
screening and IA eligibility rules meant “there is a risk that significant groups are falling 
through the gaps” of IA provision (2001b, p. 93). 
 
Despite these problems it has been widely acknowledged that the creation of the Jobs 
Network was a remarkable administrative achievement with one commentator suggesting 
that the new approach could be “the most important (post war) initiative” in re-
engineering employment assistance taken by an OECD country (Considine, 2001, p.117). 
By 2001 Australia had in place a  comprehensive employment assistance network which 
was supported  by a complex infrastructure. Performance was improving, significantly 
accelerated by the discipline of a ‘star rating system’ which took account of local factors 
and was published to better inform jobseekers, employers and other providers about 
relative performance. Despite criticisms of the star rating methodology it provided 
additional incentives for providers to work with the most disadvantaged and was to 
become the benchmark which was intended to free a large proportion of the Job Network 
from the disruption which had characterised the first two rounds of competitive 
tendering.  
  
Mutual Obligation and Work for the Dole 
 
The other major theme of Coalition policy for the unemployed has been to institutionalise 
new requirements, activities and programmes through which people receiving state 
benefits can meet what is described as their ‘mutual obligation’ to the society that pays 
for them. This new approach was first applied to the young long term unemployed in 
1998, since when someone aged 18 to 25 who has been out of work and receiving full 
benefits for over six months who does not take part in some other approved activity, such 
as part time work or education, has been required to participate in a WftD project. The for 
profit sector has been largely excluded from WftD and projects are organised by 
charities, community organisations and local authorities, and participants are required to 
participate for between 12 to 15 hours a week for up to six months, during which they 
receive an additional A$20 a fortnight. 
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WftD is not a conventional employment programme although it is expected to improve 
‘work habits’ and incentives, as well as deliver broader community benefits. Formally, 
WftD provides no direct employment assistance or training and few projects have any 
connection with employers. Instead, according to the responsible Minister, it is expected 
that projects improve the incentive to work by making regular employment seem more 
attractive than continuing to stay on benefits (Abbot, 2001). Training credits, worth about 
A$800, are now available for WftD participants, but they are only available after an 
individual completes the programme. 
 
In terms of impact, the early evidence showed that the new mutual obligation requirement 
had a significant impact on increasing ‘exit rates’ from unemployment, reducing the 
inflow to long term unemployment for the client group “by about 25%” (OECD, 2001b, 
p. 198). A Government evaluation subsequently showed that 30% of WftD participants 
were ‘off benefit’ three months after leaving as against only 17% of a matched sample of 
non-participants, giving a net impact effect of 13%. For a number of methodological 
reasons the OECD indicates that these results should be treated with caution and other 
commentators point to data which suggests that 80% of WftD participants were still 
unemployed five months after completion (Kinnear, 2000). 
 
The main impact of the programme is one of what the OECD calls ‘deterrence’, with 
three quarters of those referred to WftD failing to attend their first session. The 
Government suggests that many of these individuals were likely to have moved into jobs 
or were already working. However, there has been little research and not much is known 
about where these young people end up or about what jobs they get or how long they 
keep them. In the voluntary sector there has also been much concern about the interaction 
with sanctions and the plight of the most disadvantaged who may not only lose their 
benefit but may also lose contact with services (Pearce et al, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, the growth of ‘mutual obligation’ activities has been rapid. By 2001 a 
Government Minister was pointing out that WftD had been extended to cover all 
unemployed benefit claimants aged under 40 and about “300,000 long-term job seekers” 
a year were expected to “participate in structured activity under the Mutual Obligation 
principle” (Abbott, 2001, p. 5).  
 
‘Australians Working Together’ and Job Network Three 
 
The theme of ‘mutual obligation’ was to be central to the broader welfare reform debate 
that the Coalition Government launched in 1999. The primary concern was how to reduce 
the social, economic and financial costs associated  with increased numbers of working 
age people relying on state benefits. The final report of the Reference Group on Welfare 
Reform concluded that there was a need for radical reform and that the social security 
system should introduce new services and requirements which would promote economic 
and social participation (McClure, 2000). In particular the Group proposed that a “central 
gateway and assessment process” should provide individualised service delivery; the 
benefit system should be simplified; and there should be incentives to encourage and 
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support participation. They endorsed the mutual obligations approach but stressed that 
this should extend across the community, and not just be imposed on those receiving 
benefits. 
 
In response the Government proposed a less ambitious programme in ‘Australians 
Working Together’. This outlined a four year plan aimed at creating a new “balance 
between incentives, obligations and assistance” (FACS & DEWRSB, 2001, p.2). There 
were some limited changes in employment assistance; a further extension of the ‘mutual 
obligation’ through Work for the Dole; and the introduction of new ‘participation’ 
requirements and programmes aimed at lone parents and the ‘hardest to help’. These final 
changes are now to be delivered through a new group of personal advisers employed in 
Centrelink offices, but this service will work only with a very small group of the 
unemployed. Subsequently, in May 2002, in what has been characterised as the ‘bad 
back’ budget, the Government announced that it intended to further restrict access to 
disability benefits and expand programmes aimed at helping those who would now be 
expected to look for jobs. 
 
At the same time the Government published its plans for the next round of the Job 
Network. The aim is to “increase active job search and provide more personalised service 
for job seekers”. From July 2003 unemployed people will now select or be allocated one 
Job Network member who will “will work on a continuing basis to help job seekers 
maintain active job search”. In particular the Job Network member will assist the job 
seeker to lodge their resume on the national vacancy database, “for daily matching”. Job 
matching itself will, however, be recast as a service focused on employers, and those 
organisations who wish to claim fees for placing the unemployed will simply be required 
to comply with a code of conduct and obtain a licence. This liberalisation of the market is 
aimed at drawing in more private sector recruitment agencies thereby, it is anticipated, 
increasing the share of vacancies available to unemployed people. 
 
After three months out of work all the unemployed will be required to participate in three 
weeks JST, and after six months unemployment most will have to satisfy their mutual 
obligation requirement, with WftD being the ‘last resort’ placement. There will still be 
early entry into IA for the most disadvantaged, but significantly those who remain 
unemployed for twelve months will all now be “guaranteed customised assistance from 
their Job network member” (Abbott, 2002: my emphasis).  
 
Unemployed people will be given a new ‘Service Guarantee’ detailing the services they 
should receive, including regular personal meetings with their Job Network provider. 
Within IA the length of entitlement has been reduced to six months but participants will 
have the benefit of a Job Seeker Account (an average A$850), which Job Network 
providers will be able to use to purchase services that will help an individual obtain and 
keep a job. This can include assistance with fares, job-related training and so on. This 
Account is, however, not an entitlement. Providers will be able to vary individual 
allocations but, unlike the earlier funding model, they will not be able to retain any 
surplus that may accrue. 
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The most significant change for IA providers is that about two thirds of them will be 
offered ‘roll over’ contracts, freeing them from having to bid competitively. Roll over 
status has been determined on ‘star rating’ performance and, although not as disruptive as 
the earlier wholesale re-contracting, there has been concern about the way provider 
behaviour had been influenced, with much anecdotal evidence about some artificially 
boosting their performance for the relevant periods. Providers will continue to be paid 
largely on outputs with the previous ‘up front’ initial payment being replaced by fees for 
providing services, such as resume preparation, or being absorbed into the Job Seeker 
Account.  
 
The Government describes the new approach as ‘evolutionary’, but Jobs Australia, the 
industry association for non-profit Job Network members, has concluded that the changes 
represent a “radical shift in the direction and operations of the Network”. Jobs Australia 
suggests that the combination of contractual changes and welfare reform will, over the 
next few years, “result in a substantial shift in the way Job Network business is 
constructed, operated and financed” (JA, 2002). One significant footnote is that 
Employment National, the residual public sector provider, will be closed in June 2003. 
 
By the start of 2002 unemployed Australians faced a regulatory regime made up of a 
strange hybrid of poorly connected employment assistance and mutual obligation 
activity. The proposed reforms to the Job Network will introduce some new safeguards 
and give greater coherence, but they appear merely to rationalise existing programmes 
which still have differing objectives, which range from job entry, to social participation, 
to meeting an individual mutual obligation requirement. By contrast, the emerging British 
system has been clearly focused on ‘employment first’. 
 
New Labour, Welfare to Work and Full Employment 
 
New Labour was elected in 1997, a year after the Coalition Government came to power 
in Australia. Whilst in opposition the leadership of the Labour Party had transformed 
their approach to unemployment and the welfare state. Although New Labour abandoned 
Keynsian demand management they rejected the neo-liberal view of the Conservatives 
which, in the famous words of one Chancellor of the Exchequer, suggested that 
unemployment was “a price worth paying” to control inflation and stimulate economic 
growth (Hansard, col. 413, 16 May 1991). Instead New Labour turned to the work of 
economists that challenged the view that the ‘NAIRU’ (the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment) had to be as high as it was in the UK. The new approach suggested 
that ‘supply-side’ measures such as investment in human capital and labour market 
programmes could lower the NAIRU. The stricter job search regime introduced by the 
Conservatives was to be retained but it was to be supplemented by a minimum wage and 
a ‘New Deal’ for the long term unemployed. This ‘synthesis’ would require individuals to 
compete for and obtain jobs but would also invest in improving the ‘employability’ of 
those furthest from the labour market (Layard et al, 1991).  
 
By 2001 New Labour was proposing a more ambitious and comprehensive aim of  
transforming the ‘passive’ culture of the benefit system through the creation of an 
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‘employment first’ welfare state. The first phase of welfare reform, from 1997 until 2001, 
had witnessed the introduction of New Deal employment programmes alongside tax and 
benefit changes aimed at ‘making work pay’. The second phase was outlined first in a 
2001 Green Paper which directly linked welfare reform with full employment. Key 
policy developments include the extension of tax credits to the low paid, the 
intensification of New Deal programmes, and the introduction of mandatory ‘work 
focused interviews’ for all working age benefit claimants. Welfare reform also is being 
accompanied by major institutional change. A Department of Work and Pensions has 
been created and the Employment Service (ES) and Benefits Agency (BA) have been 
replaced by ‘Jobcentre Plus’.  
 
This agenda is formidable. The intention is to embed a new ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
culture through the transformation of the primarily ‘passive’ support offered by the post-
war welfare state into a more ‘active’ combination  of responsibilities and services 
thought relevant to the labour markets and social conditions of the new century. Jobcentre 
Plus will be at the forefront of this cultural change and will “enshrine the principle that 
everyone has an obligation to help themselves, through work wherever possible”. In 
return, Government has “an equal responsibility” to provide work related assistance for 
those “who can” as well as ensuring “greater security for those who cannot” (HMT, 2001, 
p. iv).  
 
New Labour’s institutional legacy: remaking the link between job search and 
benefits and the role of the Employment Service  
  
During the 1980s the direct administrative link between job search and benefit receipt in 
Britain weakened significantly. Between 1982 and 1986 unemployed people only had to 
‘sign on’ for their benefit and were not required to register with their local Jobcentre, the 
access point to employment programmes and vacancies. Cuts in the number of civil 
servants also reduced the administrative capacity and inclination to both encourage and 
monitor job search and deter fraud. Even when employment started to recover the data 
showed that a significant number of people claiming unemployment benefits had become 
inactive, and the average duration of unemployment increased (Wells, 2001). 
 
The turning point came in 1986 with the introduction of the ‘Restart’ initiative, which 
involved mandatory job search interviews for the long term unemployed. This new 
regime was linked with radical institutional change in the ‘unemployment market’. In 
1987/88 the delivery of training programmes for the unemployed was transferred to 
private sector led Training and Enterprise Councils, and a ‘modernised’ Employment 
Service was created as a ‘Next Steps’ Executive Agency. This agency immediately 
integrated benefit offices and Jobcentres, bringing together about 35,000 staff in a front 
line national network of over 1,100 Jobcentres. The ES worked closely with the larger 
public sector Benefits Agency which was responsible for the assessment and delivery of 
most social assistance and insurance benefits. The BA, however, had no role in delivering 
direct employment assistance. 
 
During the 1990s the role of the ES, its aims and objectives and the nature of its activities 
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changed significantly. The first trend was the emphasis on reinforcing work incentives 
and maximising and monitoring the job seeking behaviour of the unemployed. This was 
underpinned by what became known as the ‘stricter benefit regime’. The second trend 
was the shift towards a ‘work first’ system marked by a move from large scale, longer 
term, active labour market programmes towards low cost measures aimed at immediate 
job search and job entry. The third trend was a performance targets regime which was 
increasingly geared to immediate job entry, benefits policing and the imposition of 
sanctions. Finally, the ES was under constant pressure to reduce its operating costs and 
obtain better value for money.  
 
Over a ten year period the ES achieved its efficiency savings through a combination of 
market testing, contracting out, cost reviews and other techniques such as business 
process re-engineering (Fletcher, 1996, p.174). One consequence was that by 1996 the ES 
had withdrawn from most direct programme provision and, through its Regional Offices, 
contracted out its schemes via competitive tendering and performance related contracts to 
a diverse range of private providers, voluntary sector organisations, colleges, Local 
Authorities and religious groups. 
 
By 1996 the British ES was promoting itself as a high performance and high achievement 
agency, with a reputation for implementing new national initiatives to short timescales. It 
was able to show that it had been administratively effective and had made a significant 
contribution to reducing unemployment, especially long term unemployment, by 
engineering a close link between job-broking and benefit administration (ESC, 1999, vol. 
I, p. xi). Indeed, it was precisely the success of this link that persuaded the last British 
Conservative administration to retain the core activities of the ES within the public 
sector, notwithstanding their ideological commitment to privatisation (Price, 2000, p. 
304). 
 
By contrast the privatised Training and Enterprise Councils were under pressure. They 
were accumulating large trading surpluses from their contracts to deliver programmes for 
the long term unemployed, which were often retained as reserves or invested in property. 
They also struggled to meet the needs of disadvantaged groups, and it was suggested that 
this was a function of the 100% output related funding contracts which they entered into 
with their providers. It was perceived that the employer-led boards which controlled the 
TECs lacked accountability and were more concerned with in-work training, than with 
delivering programmes for the long term unemployed or socially excluded (CLES, 1992).  
 
Delivering the New Deals: the ES and Jobcentre Plus  
 
Within weeks of taking office in 1997 the Labour Government gave the public ES the 
lead responsibility for delivering its New Deal programmes. The senior managers of the 
agency grasped the opportunity to ‘reinvent’ the organisation and invested substantial 
time and resources in redefining its approach in order to modernise and rebuild its 
credibility with the unemployed, employers and other agencies. This strategy involved 
the introduction of a new generation of front line New Deal personal advisers; 
contracting with a broad range of public, voluntary and private sector organisations for 
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the delivery of new services and employment and training options; and changes to ES 
performance targets which encouraged it to work with other agencies. Another key 
dimension to the strategy involved a major national political effort to engage employers 
and other organisations in the delivery of the New Deals.  
 
The decision to implement the welfare to work strategy through the public ES was  
crucial. It provided continuity and it enabled New Labour to build its programmes on the 
Conservative’s stricter benefit regime. By contrast, the new Government was less 
committed to the private sector led Training and Enterprise Councils. After a period of 
deliberation it decided to abolish them and replace them with broader partnerships, the 
Learning and Skills Councils, which are firmly based in the public sector and responsible 
for distributing funding for all post compulsory school age education and training (apart 
from Universities). Unlike TECs, LSCs are more directly accountable and have little 
capacity to accumulate surpluses. 
 
Between 1997 and 2001 the Labour Government relied on the ES to introduce and 
administer ‘New Deals’ for the long-term unemployed, lone parents, disabled people, 
those aged over 50 and the partners of unemployed people. Although each New Deal 
addressed the particular problems of a specific client group all were  based on the 
principles first implemented in the programme for young people - “more help, more 
choices, and the support of a Personal Adviser .. matched by a greater responsibility on 
the part of individuals to help themselves” (DfEE, 2001, para 1.33). Despite the common 
framework, however, there continue to be significant differences with most resources 
being allocated to the mandatory programmes targeted at the registered (usually male) 
unemployed. Fewer resources have been allocated to the voluntary programmes aimed at 
the larger numbers of lone parents and those receiving disability benefits. 
 
Unemployed individuals who claim Job Seekers Allowance must participate in the New 
Deal. Compulsion ‘kicks in’ after six months unemployment for those aged 18 to 24, and 
after 18 months for those aged over 25 (those aged over 50 must attend advisory 
interviews but are not required to enter into more intensive employment assistance). 
Participation usually commences with an intensive advisory ‘Gateway’ process aimed at 
helping the individual find work, followed by a more or less resource intensive range of 
employment and training options which aim to improve individual employability. There 
is a ‘follow through’ process of advice and support for those who do not get a job by the 
time they complete their option. The only significant variation is in 15 areas where the 
Government has introduced Employment Zones. These are aimed at long term 
unemployed people aged over 25 and represent an alternative to the more prescriptive 
New Deal model. They are delivered by the private sector (see below).  
 
Significantly, New Deal programmes for working age people who were previously 
regarded as ‘economically inactive’ are being implemented within a mandatory, ‘rights 
and responsibilities’, framework. The childless partners of unemployed claimants, who 
are aged between 18 and 24, are now required to register as unemployed and, when 
eligible, enter the New Deal. This requirement gradually is being extended to the 
childless partners of older unemployed people and the partners of people receiving other 
 13
working age benefits. Participation in the less resource intensive New Deals for lone 
parents and for people with disabilities remains voluntary (at the time of writing), but 
these programmes now operate in a regulatory regime where working age people 
applying for and receiving state benefits are required to attend ‘work focused interviews’ 
(WFI).  
 
This ‘employment first’ regime is being implemented by ‘Jobcentre Plus’, the new public 
sector Executive Agency made up from the ES and BA. The aim is that by 2005 the 
agency will have fully integrated the work of 90,000 ES and BA staff in 1,500 local 
offices, and will have modernised service delivery, particularly through the use of 
computers, telephones and on line technologies. Jobcentre Plus offices are designed to 
reinforce the culture change. Largely open plan, they aim to deliver a ‘queueless’ 
professional service in a modern environment. The agency will be expected to process 
and pay benefits accurately and promptly, but the expectation is that those using its 
services will experience an ‘employment first’ approach. The agency will also be 
expected to work in partnership with a diverse range of public and private sector 
organisations, and to deliver its programmes through a mixed economy of providers.  
 
Delivering the Employment First Welfare State: the role of the private sector 
 
Although New Labour gave the public sector the lead role in delivering welfare reform it 
has attempted to harness, and learn from, the skills and capacities of the private sector 
both in the direct delivery of programmes and in the creation of Jobcentre Plus. In the 
process it has created new relationships both with voluntary sector organisations, for 
profit specialist employment assistance providers, and private recruitment agencies.1  
Most significantly private organisations, in a variety of partnerships with the ES, have 
been given contracts in various parts of Britain to deliver the New Deals for the 
unemployed and Employment Zones. The main contractors have been private 
employment agencies, especially Reed in Partnership and Manpower, the UK subsidiary 
of one of the largest recruitment businesses in the world, which works closely with the 
ES in a joint private sector venture called ‘Working Links’.  
 
The highest profile and longest standing involvement of the private sector has been in the 
New Deals for the unemployed where, in ten out of 144 areas, private contractors 
delivered the programmes until 2002. The areas reflected a range of different labour 
markets and the nature of private sector involvement varied. For example, in six areas the 
private sector was responsible for delivering the Gateway and all the options for young 
people, whereas in two areas the private sector organisation received a management fee 
to co-ordinate delivery.  
 
The actual funding mechanism in each private sector area varied and it has been difficult 
to establish costs as much of the information is regarded as ‘commercially confidential’. 
However, despite the differences the unifying theme was that greater the success that the 
                                                 
1 The private recruitment industry has become a significant actor in the British labour market. In 1999 they 
placed 450,000 permanent staff and registered almost a million temporary workers (Michielsens et al, 
2000). They also account for about 15% of the vacancies handled by Jobcentres. 
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private sector organisation had in moving clients quickly through the process and into 
jobs, the greater the profit they could secure and/or the greater funds they were able to 
divert to those clients who were harder to help. 
 
Initially, the private sector led areas experienced start up problems both with managing 
the programme, their relationship with ES staff, and in working with the young 
unemployed. An evaluation report attributed the initial ‘relationship’ problems to the 
suspicion and resentment that were created by the way in which the Government imposed 
the arrangements on the areas involved. In most areas relationships have improved but in 
a “minority of cases it has been more difficult to overcome initial difficulties, and 
partnership working remains undeveloped” (Rodger et al, 2000, p. vi). 
 
In practice, private sector led areas have worked well with some employers and have 
developed some innovative provision for the unemployed, with the lead organisations 
investing significant resources. Reed in Partnership, which had poor initial results, has 
since improved its performance, partly by drawing on the experience of Australian Job 
Network providers, especially by adapting some methods introduced by the Salvation 
Army. Overall, the performance of the private sector led areas improved after an initial 
settling in phase and by 2001 they broadly matched other New Deal areas. Indeed, it 
appeared that seven out of ten of the areas were achieving better unsubsidised job entry 
rates, compared with ES led districts in similar labour markets (ibid, p. vii). However, 
varying contractual arrangements make comparisons difficult and there is little 
substantial evidence that they have ‘out performed’ comparable ES led districts.  
  
Unpublished evidence, supported by a subsequent public evaluation, shows that one of 
the significant differences between private sector and ES led districts was in the use of 
options (Rodger et al, 2000). In private sector areas only 36% of those leaving the 
Gateway entered options, compared with 42% in the other areas. This had contractual 
implications. In most areas the greater use of the Gateway and a larger than expected 
movement into unsubsidised jobs resulted in proportionate decreases in their unit costs. 
By contrast in the private sector areas actual unit costs were contractually agreed in 
advance and because the entry into options was lower than that planned this produced a 
greater level of profit than anticipated. This reinforced concerns about accountability, 
transparency and ensuring value for money in the use of public funds.  
 
In 2002 ‘for profit’ private sector organisations were invited to bid to deliver the New 
Deals for the unemployed in two more districts, in addition to the original ten areas which 
came up for recontracting. One new applicant was backed by Work Directions, a 
significant Australian Job Network provider. Contracts had not been awarded at the time 
of writing but whatever the outcome it is clear that the New Deals for the unemployed 
will continue to be delivered through a mix of private and public sector led areas. 
 
Employment Zones 
 
The New Deal for unemployed people aged over 25, who have been out of work for over 
18 months, is a national programme, with prescribed processes, which is largely 
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delivered through Jobcentres. In 15 high unemployment ‘Employment Zone’ areas, 
however, the British Government is experimenting with an alternative approach. In these 
areas programme provision has been fully contracted out to the private sector, who are 
paid on the basis of how many participants they get into jobs. 
 
Participation in EZs is mandatory for unemployed people aged over 25 who have been 
out of work for over 18 months (or 12 months in a few zones). In the Zones individual 
benefit payments are combined with resources for active measures into what have been 
called ‘personal job accounts’. The EZs are delivered by private sector contractors who 
deliver three stages of support. There is an initial advisory process, which can last for up 
to 13 weeks, aimed at tackling immediate employment barriers, identifying objectives 
and agreeing a costed Action Plan using the Personal Job Account. The second phase of 
carrying out the Action Plan can last for up to six months and can involve a range of 
assistance, from training through to employment subsidies. The third step is to provide 
support once the individual is in work to ensure the employment is sustained. 
 
EZ contractors are paid through an output related funding regime, but it is significantly 
different to that used for IA in the Australian Job Network. Initially, EZ providers receive 
a starting fee of £300 and are then advanced the equivalent of 21 weeks average benefit, 
out of which they must pay the client’s benefit for up to 26 weeks. The provider keeps the 
residue if the client is placed in work before 21 weeks but has to make up the shortfall if 
the client remains unemployed. About £500 is payable on job entry and approximately 
£2,000 is payable after 13 weeks retention in a job. Apart from the Personal Job Account 
the most significant contrast with Australia is that EZ contractors have no other private 
sector competitors in those areas where they are awarded contracts.  
 
One of the most distinctive features of the EZ approach is that an Adviser and participant 
together agree how the funding in the Personal Job Account can best be used to overcome 
specific employment barriers. This can include expenditure to cover immediate 
employment barriers, such as the cost of work clothes, through to purchasing job related 
training. Devolving this decision making to front line advisers has been one of the most 
successful parts of the EZ approach, and has already been extended through the national 
New Deals where personal advisers can now spend up to £150 per participant on tackling 
immediate employment barriers. By contrast there is emerging evidence that, as in 
Australia, the funding model discourages providers from paying for “lengthy” training 
courses or “cover the cost of intensive support for participants facing acute barriers”  
(Martin, 2002, p. 21). 
 
Within two years the EZs appeared to be generating significantly increased job entry 
rates in very difficult areas. Before the publication of any formal evaluation the Prime 
Minister publicly endorsed the approach, emphasising that in the zones local flexibility, 
discretion, the focus on job outcomes, and a front line “can do” mentality, had secured 
“really impressive job outcomes” and were “popular with claimants” He indicated that 
the Government intended to build on the approach by extending it to other clients groups, 
such as lone parents (PM, 2002). 
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The private sector and Jobcentre Plus 
 
While EZs may have demonstrated added value the attempt to involve the private sector 
in the delivery of Jobcentre Plus was far less successful.  
 
The creation of Jobcentre Plus was preceded by an experimental phase where in twelve 
districts the Government initiated a variety of different delivery models intended to 
integrate employment assistance and benefit delivery in a ‘work focussed’ system. One of 
these variants was described as the ‘Private Voluntary Sector Model’, which was tried out 
in four areas. Two were led by for profit agencies which were also delivering the New 
Deal; two were delivered through consortia led by a major consultancy company 
(W&PSC, 2002, p. 30).  
 
In creating the PVS partnerships, Ministers said they wished “to harness the enthusiasm, 
expertise and knowledge of the private and voluntary sector in … developing innovative 
and flexible ways of delivering” the new service (ibid, p. 31). However, a Parliamentary 
inquiry found that the PVS pilots quickly faced problems which the public sector led 
pilots did not face. They had been given only nine weeks between winning the contracts 
to run the service and being expected to be fully operational, and private sector managers 
faced a steep learning curve in getting to grips with the new business. The PVS pilots 
also had staffing turnover problems, as staff seconded from public sector agencies 
returned to their home agencies, particularly as the planned period of the pilots came to 
an end.  This led to direct recruitment of external staff, but “with an inevitable drop in 
levels of performance as new, less-qualified staff learned the job”. The limited nature of 
the PVS pilots also meant less opportunity to draft in extra staff from a wider area at 
periods of extreme pressure. The relatively short length of the contracts also inhibited 
both capital investment and the development of modern information technology systems.  
 
All the private companies were heavily critical of the contractual terms under which they 
were expected to run the pilots, which in their view, restricted the scope for innovation 
and led to poor outcomes in getting people into work.  Their criticisms of the contract 
have a wider relevance, in that they highlight  issues concerning the culture and priorities 
of the main Government Department. The contracts operated on a capped funding model, 
with remuneration heavily linked to meeting fixed targets to do with benefits processing, 
and meeting a defined percentage of ES job placement targets.  A major criticism of the 
contract was that it prioritised output measures over outcomes.  Output related funding 
targets around quality of completion of forms and the number of days before an initial 
work-focused meeting carried greater payment returns than output measures - getting 
people into jobs.  Therefore, when the pilots came under pressure due to high claimant 
demand and  shortage of staff it was the work-focused element which got squeezed.  
 
The private companies also expressed their exasperation at what they saw as the over-
bureaucratic and inflexible attitude of the officials supervising the PVS pilots to 
proposals for innovation. Subsequently, the major consultancy company has withdrawn 
from the pilots, and in the other two areas the private sector lead will gradually give way 
to the public sector led Jobcentre Plus model. The Parliamentary Committee concluded 
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that the private sector was not “well used” in this exercise, although the result could be 
interpreted as a successful outcome for the public sector, in that a major competitive 
threat had been removed (at least in the short term). 
 
The employment impacts of the New Deals 
 
There is as yet little public data available on the relative performance of the public and 
private sector variations in the delivery of the Labour Government’s employment 
assistance programmes. Nevertheless, by the end of 2001 it was pointed out that well 
over half a million people had found jobs through the various New Deals and that some 
53% of the young people going through the most developed New Deal were entering 
employment. Just under 80% of the jobs they obtained were ‘sustained’ for over 13 
weeks.  
 
The combination of employment growth and the New Deals produced significant 
reductions in JSA unemployment, especially amongst the younger long term unemployed 
(McDonagh and Asvesta, 2002, Table 2). Between April 1997 and April 2002 the number 
of 18 to 24 year olds in GB who were out of work and claiming JSA for over 26 weeks, 
the point at which they enter the New Deal but are still receiving JSA, fell sharply from 
87,700 to 39,800, a fall of over 55%. The most dramatic impact was on those registered as 
unemployed for over a year, where the number fell from 90,700 to 5,100, a fall of almost 
95%. The reduction in the shorter term unemployed was, however, less marked, with the 
number of those out of work for less than 26 weeks only falling some 16%, from 243,200 in 
April 1997 to 204,300 in April 2002. There were some cyclical factors at work, with the 
inflow into unemployment increasing in early 2002, but this data reinforced concern that the 
New Deal might be ‘recycling’ the unemployed, rather than moving them directly into jobs.  
 
Establishing the net additional employment impact of the New Deal, the measurable 
economic difference it has made, is complex. Nevertheless, the most authoritative 
econometric findings come from evaluations of the New Deal for Young People carried out 
by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (Anderton et al, 1999; Riley 
and Young, 2000) and the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Blundell, 2001). Both studies 
concluded that there was a positive impact with the IFS finding an “economically and 
statistically significant effect” on the flow of young men from JSA to employment 
(Blundell, 2001, p. 34). The NIESR findings were themselves independently scrutinised 
by the National Audit Office, which concluded that on the evidence it was “reasonable” 
to conclude that in its first two years NDYP was cost effective and directly reduced levels 
of youth unemployment by between 25,000 and 45,000 and increased youth employment 
by between 8,000 and 20,000 (NAO, 2002, Part 3).  
 
There have been other, less favourable, assessments of the employment impact of the New 
Deal. Apart from those who suggest that the reduction in youth unemployment has simply 
reflected the strength of the economy, others point out that despite the reduction in  long 
term youth unemployment about a third of those who participated in NDYP returned to 
unemployment and about one in five of those who did obtain a job failed to retain it for 13 
weeks. Some of these young people are now entering the programme for a second or third 
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time. This problem is most acute for young black people and for those in many inner urban 
and depressed industrial labour markets where, it is suggested, the concentrated geography 
of unemployment leads to the “recycling and churning” of participants and that local ‘jobs 
gaps’ have undermined the programme (Martin et al, 2001). In response, Government 
economists have argued that appropriate vacancies arise in most local labour markets, and 
that participation has reduced the ‘scarring’ effect of long term unemployment with those re-
entering the programme exiting at the same rate as the newly unemployed rather than 
becoming ‘detached’ and entering long term unemployment. In its ‘Next Phase’ of the New 
Deal the Government has also responded by increasing efforts to achieve ‘parity’ of  
employment outcomes for ethnic minorities, and by introducing ‘Step Up’, a temporary job 
creation programme targeted at high unemployment areas and aimed at those who fail to get 
unsubsidised jobs through the New Deal (DWP, 2001). 
 
The ‘net’ employment outcomes of the NDYP continue to be contested, and the detailed 
evaluation results for the other evolving welfare to work programmes, especially for lone 
parents and the older unemployed, have also been challenged. Nevertheless, the balance 
of the evidence supports the conclusion that the strategy is accelerating the return to 
work, especially of the long term unemployed, and that it is contributing at least some net 
increase in employment (Blundell, 2001). These results are being secured through a 
complex structure of partnerships and a mixed economy of providers, within which there 
are significant new dimensions of private sector involvement. It is now clear that 
Jobcentre Plus will continue to draw on the private sector as it copes with the 
administrative challenge of implementing an ‘employment first’ regime, but what is still 
unclear is the extent to which the private sector will be involved in the delivery of 
infrastructure and services. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Australia and Britain have embarked on radical changes in their employment assistance 
and social security systems. Both countries have recognised that modernising the welfare 
state requires more than rhetoric, new regulations or even discrete programmes. They 
have, however, chosen to reinvent the governance and delivery of employment assistance 
in very different ways. Australia has created a fully contestable market; Britain has 
created a new national ‘employment first’ public sector led Executive Agency, albeit one 
that works through a range of ‘private public partnerships’. 
 
The earlier sections of this paper identified many of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Australian employment placement market. In essence the new system gives greater 
flexibility and discretion to contractors and their front line staff and appears to secure 
similar results to the earlier Job Compact but for far less expenditure. The plans for the 
next phase of the Job Network signal that  successful providers will have their contracts 
renewed, albeit they will have to deliver services in a very different way involving far 
greater emphasis on monitoring job search activity and behaviour. The new Job Seeker 
Account may induce providers to invest more in improving the employability of the 
hardest to place, but there is considerable scepticism that the resources available will 
enable or incentivise providers to more effectively tackle significant underlying 
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employment barriers or build human capital. IA may only be available for unemployed 
people once or twice, whereas Work for the Dole will be mandatory after each six months 
of unemployment but it will still not provide direct employment assistance. Centrelink 
will continue to be the gateway to the Network and will retain responsibility for 
monitoring compliance with the activity test and mutual obligation, and impose sanctions 
when required, but it has been given no direct role in employment assistance, especially 
for those who do not get jobs after their programme ends. Instead, Centrelink is creating a 
parallel personal adviser service for more disadvantaged groups, and is being expected to 
deliver new programmes which stress social as much as economic participation. For the 
unemployed in particular the apparent combination of employment assistance with 
participation focused mutual obligation requirements leaves in place what is still likely to 
be experienced as a fragmented and complex hybrid. 
 
Britain’s New Deals for the unemployed reflect a different type of approach which tries 
to avoid some of the weaknesses that limited the impact of the Job Compact, and contains 
many of the additional ‘tools’ which the OECD thought were absent in the marketised 
Australian system. Nevertheless, the British approach has its own limitations and 
challenges, and despite more generous funding and a buoyant economy, it has also 
struggled to deliver employment outcomes for the most disadvantaged amongst the long 
term unemployed. Ironically, the more limited British experience of drawing in the 
private sector confirms, though on a smaller scale, many of the strengths and weaknesses 
evident in Australia, especially in Employment Zones. Giving flexibility and discretion to 
providers and their front line staff seems to generate better outcomes, but unless output 
related funding contracts are properly specified, the pressure will be on providers to work 
with the most job ready and they will be reluctant to invest in higher cost provision which 
may improve longer term employability, but not short term profitability.  
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